Reading 45

The following passage is taken from a book by George C. Herring titled From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations since 1776 (© 2008 by George C. Herring).

1. From their foundation, the
2. American colonies were an
3. integral part of the British
4. Empire, and hence of an
5. Atlantic trading community.
6. According to the dictates of
7. mercantilism, then the
8. dominant school of economic
9. thought, the colonies supplied
10. the mother country with
11. timber, tobacco, and other
12. agricultural products and
13. purchased its manufactured
14. good.
15. But the Americans also broke
16. from prescribed trade patterns.
17. New England and New York
18. developed an extensive illicit
19. commerce with French Canada,
20. even while Britain was at war
21. with France. They also opened a
22. lucrative commerce with Dutch
23. and French colonies in the
24. West Indies, selling food and
25. other necessities and buying
26. sugar more cheaply than it
27. could be acquired from the
28. British West Indies. Americans
29. benefited in many ways from
30. Britain’s mercantilist Navigation
31. Acts, but they staunchly resisted
32. efforts to curb their trade with
33. the colonies of other European
34. nations.
35. The American colonies were also
36. part of a Eurocentric
37. “international” community.
38. Formed at the Peace of
39. Westphalia in 1648, this new
40. system sought to end years of
41. bloody religious strife by
42. enlarging the stature and role
43. of the nation-state. Based in
44. part on concepts developed by
45. Hugo Grotius, the father of
46. international law, Westphalia
47. established principles such as
48. the sovereign equality of states,
49. non-interference by one state
50. in the domestic affairs of others,
51. peaceful resolution of disputes,
52. and the obligation to abide by
53. international agreements.
54. After Westphalia, diplomacy
55. and war came under the
56. purview of civil rather than
57. religious authority. A corps of
58. professional diplomats emerged
59. to handle interstate relations.
60. A code was produced to guide
61. their conduct. François de
62. Callières’s classic manual of the
63. eighteenth-century diplomatic
64. art affirmed that negotiations
65. should be conducted in good
66. faith, honorably, and without
67. deceit – “a lie always leaves a
68. drop of poison behind.” On
69. the other hand, spies were
70. essential for information
71. gathering, and bribes–although
72. that word was not used—were
73. encouraged.
74. Negotiation required keen
75. powers of observation,
76. concentration on the task at
77. hand, sound judgment, and
78. presence of mind, de Callières
79. explained. But a “gift presented
80. in the right spirit, at the right
81. moment, by the right person,
82. may act with tenfold power upon
83. him who receives it.” It was also
84. important to cultivate the ladies
85. of the court, for “the greatest
86. events have sometimes followed
87. the toss of a fan or the nod
88. of a head.”
89. Far from eliminating war, the
90. new system simply changed the
91. reasons for fighting and the
92. means of combat. Issues of war
93. and peace were decided on the
94. basis of national interest as
95. defined by the monarch and
96. his court. Nation-states acted
97. on the basis of realpolitik rather
98. than religious considerations,
99. changing sides in alliances
100. when it suited their foreign
101. policy goals. Rulers deliberately
102. restricted the means and ends
103. of combat. They had seen the
104. costs and dangers of unleashing
105. the passions of their people.
106. They had made substantial
107. investments in their armies,
108. needed them for domestic
109. order, and were loath to risk
110. them in battle.
111. Once involved in war, they
112. sought to avoid major battles,
113. employed professional armies
114. in cautious strategies of
115. attrition, used tactics
116. emphasizing maneuver and
117. fortification, and held to
118. unwritten rules protecting
119. civilian lives and property.
120. Their aim was to sustain the
121. balance of power rather than
122. destroy the enemy. War was
123. to be conducted with minimal
124. intrusion into the lives of the
125. people. Indeed, that master
126. practitioner of limited war,
127. Prussia’s Frederick the Great,
128. once observed that war was
129. not a success if most people
130. knew it was going on.